We study the determinants of vertical integration in a new dataset of over 750,000 …rms from 93 countries. We present a simple model of the e¤ects of …nancial development and contracting costs on cross-country di¤erences in the extent of vertical integration. The focus of the model is on the interaction e¤ects of …nancial development and contracting costs. In particular, the model suggests that vertical integration should be higher when contracting institutions are weak so that within-…rm transactions are preferred to arm's-length relationships, while at the same time there is su¢ cient …nancial development so that upstream and downstream …rms can vertically integrate. In the data, there is a correlation between vertical integration on the one hand and …nancial development and the quality of contracting institutions on the other hand. But these correlations appear to be spurious and entirely accounted for by di¤erences in industrial composition across countries, and thus do not o¤er support to theories that emphasize the main e¤ects of …nancial development and contracting institutions on the internal organization of the …rm. However, we …nd relatively robust empirical support for the interaction e¤ects suggested by our simple model. First, there is a robust interaction e¤ect of …nancial development combined with contracting costs-vertical integration is signi…cantly greater in countries with higher contracting costs and greater …nancial development. Second, we …nd a di¤erential e¤ect of contracting costs across industries; countries with higher contracting costs are signi…cantly more vertically integrated in industries that are more capital intensive.
Introduction
Casual empiricism suggests the presence of signi…cant di¤erences in the organization of production across countries. For example, …rms are often thought to be larger and more vertically integrated in less-developed countries. Palepu (1997, 2000) provide evidence consistent with this view and suggest that this is because market and contractual relationships are more costly in less-developed countries. Nevertheless, there has not been a systematic analysis of cross-country di¤erences in vertical integration and their causes. Our primary aim in this paper is to make a …rst attempt at such a systematic analysis and to investigate the relationship between important institutional characteristics and vertical integration across countries.
Two well-established theories o¤er predictions on how di¤erences in (speci…c) institutional characteristics of countries should a¤ect the internal organization of the …rm in general and vertical integration in particular. First, according to the highly in ‡uential Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory pioneered by Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , the internal organization of a …rm is designed to improve incentives and limit agency costs. Vertical integration is perhaps the best known application of this theory. Vertical integration encourages speci…c investments and reduces holdup problems when markets are imperfect. According to TCE, vertical integration should therefore be more prevalent when it is harder to write long-term contracts between upstream and downstream …rms. This prediction is not entirely unambiguous, however. The more sophisticated approach to vertical integration developed by the Property Rights Theories (PRT) of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) emphasizes that vertical integration will also create "transaction costs"since employees, like outside suppliers, need to be given incentives to invest, and the fact that they do not have the property rights to tangible assets may weaken their incentives. In the PRT whether better contracting institutions should induce more or less vertical integration is not entirely clear. 1 A second body of work emphasizes the importance of contracts and other relationships between …rms and …nancial intermediaries. In this view, credit market imperfections a¤ect the organization of the …rm. Monitoring and contract enforcement are costly, so entrepre-neurs need collateral in order to obtain …nancing (Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Legros and Newman, 1996) , and they may need to rely on bank …nancing (Diamond and Rajan, 2005, Diamond, 2004) . When credit markets have greater imperfections and when a lack of …nancial development limits the pool of potential entrepreneurs, there should be less entry and, most likely, larger …rms in a country Zingales, 1998, Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 1999) .
Because larger …rms are more likely to produce some of their own inputs or market some of their own outputs, the …nancial view suggests that better …nancial institutions and credit markets may be associated with less vertical integration. Nevertheless, the e¤ect of …nancial development on vertical integration is not unambiguous either. In particular, it may be that a lack of …nancial development prevents …rms that would otherwise like to vertically integrate from doing so (see, for example, McMillan and Woodru¤, 1999) . Therefore, both the e¤ects of …nancial institutions and contracting institutions on vertical integration are potentially ambiguous and a better understanding of these relationships requires an empirical investigation of the links between the quality of contracting institutions, …nancial development, and vertical integration.
While the relationship between the e¤ect of …nancial and contracting institutions on vertical integration is potentially ambiguous, we argue that there are more robust predictions regarding the interaction between the quality of contracts and …nancial development. In particular, we present a simple model highlighting that it is higher contracting costs in combination with greater …nancial development that should lead to greater vertical integration.
The intuition for this prediction is simple: higher contracting costs in a country may create a demand for vertical integration in certain sectors, but without su¢ cient …nancial development, …rms may not have the required credit to make the necessary acquisitions (McMillan and Woodru¤, 1999) . Second, our model predicts another interaction e¤ect of contracting costs and industry characteristics. Speci…cally, we predict a disproportionate e¤ect of contracting costs on the vertical integration decision in industries that are more susceptible to holdup problems.
We investigate the cross-country determinants of vertical integration using a new dataset of over 750,000 …rms from 93 countries. Our methodology follows the …nance literature in taking the United States as a benchmark (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) , and we combine our …rm-level data with the U.S. input-output tables (which are assumed to accurately describe the technological possibilities in other parts of the world). While there are some limitations to our data, they nonetheless provide a new opportunity to understand how the organization of production di¤ers across countries.
First, we look for the main e¤ects of …nancial development and contracting costs on the degree of vertical integration across countries. Although both cross-country di¤erences in …nancial development and contracting institutions are correlated with vertical integration, it turns out that these correlations are largely spurious. These cross-country di¤erences in vertical integration are entirely accounted for by di¤erences in industrial composition across countries. Once we control for di¤erences in industrial composition, contracting costs and credit market development have little explanatory power for di¤erences in vertical integration. Thus, it is not the case that countries with greater contracting costs or credit market imperfections tend to be more vertically integrated in a given sector. Rather, such countries tend to be concentrated in sectors that are naturally vertically integrated wherever they are in the world. We also investigate whether di¤erences in …nancial development and contracting costs may be the reason for the di¤erences in industrial composition and …nd no compelling evidence to support this hypothesis.
Our main results, on the other hand, focus on the interactions between …nancial development and contracting costs. Consistent with our simple model, we …nd that …nancial development and contracting costs together have a robust interaction e¤ect on the level of vertical integration in a country. Vertical integration is more likely when both contracting costs and …nancial development are high. This result is signi…cant even when we control for industrial composition. In addition, we conduct a number of robustness checks and …nd that the result is robust in a wide variety of speci…cations. The strong interactive e¤ect of contracting costs and …nancial development suggest that both factors in combination may be important for the equilibrium organization of production.
Finally, our third set of results focuses on the e¤ects of contracting costs across di¤er-ent industries. Our model predicts that contracting costs should have a greater e¤ect in industries that are more subject to holdup problems. Employing capital intensity as a proxy for the degree of holdup problems, we …nd that higher contracting costs are associated with greater vertical integration in industries that are capital intensive. We also …nd this result to be robust to a series of alternative speci…cations. These results suggest that lack of e¢ -cient contract enforcement mechanisms may lead to greater vertical integration especially in relatively capital intense industries.
Despite the congruence between our theoretical predictions and the empirical results, it should be emphasized that the interaction results reported in this paper cannot be interpreted as causal relationships. Instead, it may be some other (omitted) characteristics that lead to the relationship between vertical integration and the interaction of industry characteristics and contracting costs. A more detailed investigation of potential causal e¤ects requires either a more structural approach or an instrumental variables strategy, which we view as an important area for future work.
Our paper relates to the existing literature in a number of ways. The comparative …-nance literature …nds that countries with less …nancial development will tend not to develop in industries requiring greater external …nance (Rajan and Zingales 1998), but has not investigated cross-country di¤erences in vertical integration or in the internal organization of …rms. 2 Also related to our paper are cross-country comparative studies, including Bain (1966 3 These papers typically focus on concentration, …rm size, and entry. Earlier papers use OECD data, while more recent papers use data from the Amadeus database for Western and Eastern Europe, or from the Worldscope database, which contains information only for relatively large publicly traded …rms. Our dataset is, to the best of our knowledge, unique in allowing us to look at a relatively broad cross-section of countries and a large sample of …rms, including both private and public companies and medium-size as well as large …rms. In addition, none of these studies focuses on the internal organization of the …rm or vertical integration.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a simple model to motivate our empirical work. Section 3 describes the data used for the study. Section 4 presents results on the main e¤ects of …nancial development and contracting costs on vertical integration. 2 There is a large literature on vertical integration in speci…c industries in the United States, including Joskow's (1987) seminal paper on ownership arrangements in electricity generating plants, Stuckey's (1983) study of integration between aluminium re…neries and bauxite mines, Monteverde and Teece's (1982) investigation of integration in the automobile industry, Masten's (1984) work on the aerospace industry, Ohanian's (1994) work on the pulp and paper industry, Klein's (1988) work on the Fisher Body and General Motors relationship, Hubbard's (2001, 2003) study of the trucking industry, Lerner and Merges' (1998) work on the biotech sector, and Chipty's (2001) paper on market foreclosure in the cable television industry. Woodru¤'s (2002) work on the Mexican footwear industry is the only paper we are aware of that provide a systematic study of vertical integration in a developing economy. Finally, Antràs (2003) studies the relationship between capital intensity and outsourcing using 23 U.S. industries. 3 Another well-known approach, the market foreclosure theory, views vertical integration as a method of increasing monopoly power by downstream …rms (e.g., Perry, 1978 , Aghion and Bolton, 1987 , Hart and Tirole, 1990 , Ordover, Salop, and Saloner, 1990 , and Chipty, 2001 ). We show that our results are robust to controlling for measures of antitrust regulations (as in Dutz and Hayri, 1999) . However, because the available data on cross-country di¤erences in antitrust regulation are more limited, we do not focus on antitrust issues in this paper.
Section 5 presents our major results, which focus on the predictions of our simple model concerning the interaction e¤ects. Section 6 concludes.
Motivating Theory
In this section, we present a simple model of vertical integration in the presence of contract enforcement problems and imperfect capital markets. Our purpose is not to provide a comprehensive theory of vertical integration, but to derive a number of simple predictions to confront with data. For this reason, we make a number of simplifying assumptions and try to communicate the main ideas most e¤ectively.
Environment
Consider the following simple game between a supplier and a producer. Both parties are risk neutral and maximize expected pro…ts. The supplier can produce an input of quality q at the cost c (q). We assume that c ( ) is strictly increasing, convex and di¤erentiable with c (0) = 0, and that it satis…es the following Inada conditions, c 0 (0) = 0 and lim q!1 c 0 (q) = 1. Using this input, the producer can manufacture and sell output worth q. The skills necessary for the production of the input are speci…c to the supplier and the skills necessary for manufacturing are speci…c to the producer. Hence the production of the …nal good is not possible without the participation of either of these two parties. The outside options of both the supplier and the producer are normalized to zero.
We consider two possible organizational forms:
Vertical integration, with the supplier buying the producer.
Under non-integration, the game form is as follows:
1. The supplier makes an o¤er to the producer, (q c ; p c ), which implies that the supplier will deliver an input of quality q c and receive a price of p c .
2. The producer decides whether to accept the contract.
3. Following acceptance of the contract, with probability , the contract is upheld. With probability 1 , the contract is not upheld, and there will be bargaining between the producer and the supplier.
4. After this uncertainty is revealed, the supplier chooses quality q.
5.
If the contract is upheld, the producer receives the input and if the input is of the speci…ed quality q c , the supplier receives the speci…ed price. Otherwise, the supplier receives zero payments (and the producer still acquires the input).
6. If the contract is not upheld, the supplier and the producer bargain over a price that the producer has to pay for the input of quality q that the supplier has produced.
At this point, they both have zero outside options and we assume that they engage in asymmetric Nash/Rubinstein bargaining with the bargaining power of the supplier equal to . 4 7. Transactions take place and the producer manufactures and sells the …nal good.
Note that this game form introduces a form of incomplete contracts, since it is not possible to perfectly contract on quality and payments. In particular, when = 0, the contracts are fully incomplete as in the standard incomplete contracts models of Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 or Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1989) . However, our interest here is not on incompleteness because of technological reasons, but because of contract enforcement problems resulting from weak institutions, especially from the failure of courts to enforce contracts. Thus, we interpret as a measure of the quality of courts and the extent of contract enforcement. The higher is this parameter, the more likely are contracts to be enforced in the society under consideration. 5 Notice also that we have assumed the contract o¤er is made by the supplier. This is to ensure symmetry with the vertical integration o¤er below, which will also be made by the supplier.
Under vertical integration, the supplier owns the producer. 6 The game form in this case is simple: the supplier makes an o¤er of a wage w to the producer for his services. Whether these services have been rendered or not is observable at some cost ( ), which may potentially depend on the contracting institutions in the society, i.e., ( ) could be increasing in . The producer receives the wage only if it provides the services. The supplier also chooses its own investment in quality, q. The fact that the cost of vertical integration is taken as given, as equal to ( ), makes the approach to vertical integration here more similar to the TCE approach of Williamson than to the PRT approach of Grossman-Hart-Moore.
We now proceed to characterizing the subgame perfect equilibria of this game under vertical integration and non-integration. We will then look at the decision to integrate and at that point also describe potential credit market imperfections facing the …rms.
Equilibrium Under Vertical Integration
Let us write the objective function of the supplier as
where w is the wage o¤er to the producer, ( ) is the cost of insuring compliance by the producer under vertical integration, which the supplier will have to incur, and a p 2 f0; 1g denotes whether the producer accepts the o¤er. Since the producer's outside option is equal to zero, he will accept the o¤er, i.e., a p = 1, as long as w 0. This implies that the optimal contract for the supplier is
where q is the …rst-best quality level uniquely determined by
The uniqueness of q is an immediate consequence of the strict convexity of c (which implies that c 0 is everywhere strictly decreasing). The existence of an interior solution is guaranteed by the Inada conditions. Therefore, vertical integration achieves the …rst-best quality. This conclusion is in line with Williamson's (1975 Williamson's ( , 1985 theory of vertical integration, which emphasizes the contractual distortions in arm's-length relationships, but not those that arise within vertically integrated organizations.
The pro…ts of the supplier and the producer under vertical integration, V I s and V I p , are therefore
The strict convexity of c, together with (1), implies that q c (q ) > 0. However, whether V I s > 0 will depend on the size of the transaction cost associated with vertical integration, ( ). Naturally if V I s < 0, vertical integration will never take place in equilibrium.
Equilibrium Under Non-Integration
To characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium in this case, let us start by backward induction. First consider the subgame in which contracts are upheld. According to the timing of events speci…ed above, the supplier makes the o¤er and the producer has the option not to accept this o¤er and receive zero. This implies that the contract (q c ; p c ) must be such that
since if p c > q c , the producer would turn down the o¤er and if p c < q c , the supplier could increase the price for given quality q c and make more pro…ts. Moreover, since c ( ) satis…es the Inada conditions, there will exist a contract with p c = q c that is pro…table for the supplier. 7 Given that the contracts are being upheld, the supplier will indeed choose q = q c and receive p c . 8 Consequently, in the subgame in which contracts are enforced, we must have p c = q c and the supplier will choose quality q c . This will lead to zero pro…ts for the producer and to a pro…t of q c c (q c ) for the supplier. Now consider the subgame in which contracts are not upheld and the supplier chooses some quality q. Recall that there is now asymmetric Nash bargaining, with weights and 1 and with zero outside options, where 2 (0; 1). This implies that in this case, the producer and the the supplier will agree to exchange the input of quality q at the price
Therefore, after learning that the contracts will not be upheld, the supplier maximizes
which has a unique solution given byq > 0 such that
7 In particular, qc c (qc) is strictly positive for qc su¢ ciently small. 8 If, after the signing of the contract, it supplied an input of quality lower than qc, then the supplier would receive zero payment. In particular, choosing any q < qc will necessarily give lower pro…ts to the supplier, since it would not receive the payment pc. Moreover, under contract enforcement it does not have an option to withhold the input.
Again, uniqueness follows from the strict convexity of c. The fact that the solution is an interior solution, i.e.,q > 0, is guaranteed by the Inada conditions. Moreover, the strict convexity of c ( ) ensures thatq is increasing in , and as long as < 1, we havê q < q ; so that when contracts are not upheld, there will be underinvestment in quality. 9 Therefore, before the uncertainty about whether contracts will be upheld or not is resolved, the expected payo¤s of the two …rms are
where we have imposed the result, obtained above, that p c = q c so that the producer makes zero pro…ts when contracts are upheld and the supplier receives q c c (q c ) (probability ).
We have also incorporated the optimal investmentq of the supplier and the resulting pro…ts when contracts are not upheld (probability 1 ).
The only choice variable for the supplier is then q c . Maximizing N I s with respect to this implies that the contractually speci…ed quality q c must equal the e¢ cient quality q as given by (1) and
Consequently, the ex ante payo¤s can be written as:
where the fact that both expressions are strictly positive again follows from the convexity of c ( ) and the fact thatq > 0. The social gain from vertical integration can now be obtained
This expression implies that if the transaction costs of implementing the vertically integrated organizational structure, ( ), are not very large, vertical integration will produce strictly more surplus than non-integration. 9 Here a lower reduces investments, since is the share of the supplier, which is the party that is undertaking the investment. In view of this, we will identify "lower " with "more severe holdup problems".
Vertical Integration Decision
We now consider the vertical integration decision. The producer and the supplier start out as separate …rms, and before stage 1 in the above timing of events, the supplier makes an o¤er to buy the producer by paying an amount t. If the producer accepts this o¤er, it receives t, and there is vertical integration. If it rejects the o¤er, there are no transfers and the producer and the supplier play the non-integration game above.
The only additional complication is that the supplier is potentially credit constrained.
Thus every dollar paid at the beginning of the game costs the supplier (1 + ) dollars, where 0 is a measure of credit market frictions.
The payo¤s of the two parties at this stage of the game can then be written as:
where we use capital letters to distinguish them from the payo¤s after the organizational form has been determined, and we also condition the payo¤s on the strategies at this stage A p 2 f0; 1g, which denotes the decision of the producer whether to accept the vertical integration o¤er of the supplier, and on t, which denotes the o¤er from the supplier (t = 0 here corresponds to a "no o¤er" from the supplier, since it will necessarily be rejected in view of the fact that N I p > 0 from (3)). Clearly, the producer will accept, A p = 1, only if
Given the above expressions, this happens only if
Therefore, the supplier, if she wishes to go ahead with vertical integration, will o¤ert.
Is vertical integration pro…table for the supplier? Clearly this depends on whether
Using the expressions derived above, this is equivalent to:
Rearranging this expression, we obtain that there will be vertical integration in equilibrium
Inspection of (4) shows that if = 0 and ( ) = 0, that is, if credit markets are perfect and there are no transaction costs associated with vertical integration, there will necessarily be vertical integration. This follows from the observation in the previous subsection that vertical integration reaches the e¢ cient level of input quality, while non-integration leads to underinvestment. However, with imperfect credit markets or transaction costs of vertical integration, non-integration can arise in equilibrium.
Further inspection of this condition establishes the following results:
Proposition 1 (Main E¤ ects) Vertical integration is more likely when credit market imperfections are limited, i.e., when is lower.
The e¤ ects of the extent of contract enforcement and holdup problems, and , on vertical integration are ambiguous.
Proof. These results follow from (4). Higher reduces the left-hand side and has no e¤ect on the right-hand side, thus making (4) less likely to hold. To obtain an expression for the impact of higher (which we will utilize below), consider the derivative of the left-hand side of (4), denoted by LHS, with respect to :
where we have used the fact that c 0 (q ) = from (2). This condition shows that the impact of on the vertical integration decision is ambiguous.
Finally, to see that the impact of is also ambiguous note …rst that its e¤ect on the left-hand side of (4) is ambiguous and depends on and the gap between q andq , and second that the right-hand side of (4) also depends on .
This proposition shows that there is no immediate relationship between the extent of contract enforcement, , and the vertical integration outcome. This is both because the extent of contract enforcement a¤ects the price that the supplier has to pay the producer to ensure vertical integration and also because the quality of contracts might also a¤ect the e¢ ciency Proposition 2 (Interaction E¤ ects) Vertical integration is more likely when there are both more developed credit markets and more severe contract enforcement problems, i.e., when both and are lower.
Moreover, if more severe holdup problems (low ) encourage vertical integration, then this e¤ ect becomes stronger when there are also severe contract enforcement problems, i.e., when both and are lower.
Proof. The proof again follows from (4) . To obtain the …rst result, note that
so that the left-hand side of (4) will be greater when both and are lower, while the right-hand side does not depend on . This establishes the …rst claim.
Next the cross partial of the left-hand side with respect to and is
This expression is positive if and only if (5) is negative. Recall that (5) being negative implies that more severe holdup problems, i.e., lower , makes vertical integration more likely. Since the right-hand side of (4) does not depend on , the cross partial in (6) then implies that when this is the case, (4) is more likely to hold when both and are lower, that is, when there are both more severe holdup problems and worse contracting problems. This establishes the second claim.
Intuitively, severe contract enforcement problems make vertical integration more likely, but suppliers will only be able to acquire producers if they can raise enough …nance. Thus some degree of …nancial development combined with weak contracting institutions is conducive to greater vertical integration. 10 In addition, the e¤ect of contracting institutions 1 0 This result is robust to considering situations in which producers acquire suppliers. Moreover, if we should be more pronounced when we look at situations in which potential holdup problems are more important (that is, situations in which holdup problems in arm's-length relationships already favor vertical integration).
In the empirical work below, will start by looking at the main e¤ects, but our focus will be the two interaction predictions in Proposition 2.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our …rm-level data come from WorldBase. This database, compiled by Dun & Bradstreet for the primary purpose of providing business contacts, contains information on millions of public and private …rms around the world. For each …rm, WorldBase reports the 4-digit SIC code of the primary industry in which the …rm operates, and the SIC codes of up to …ve secondary industries, listed in descending order of importance. 11 WorldBase includes data for 213 di¤erent countries. We exclude 19 of these because they are not de…ned as countries in the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. 12 In addition, because not all of the countries in WorldBase include reporting of secondary industries, our analysis is restricted to 93 countries for which this information is available.
Our sample consists of all …rms in these countries in the September 2002 WorldBase …le, with a maximum of 30,000 per country (a limit imposed due to cost constraints). For those countries with more than 30,000 …rms, the 30,000 largest are selected, ranked by annual sales.
We include …rms from all industries, except those operating only in "wholesale trade" and "retail trade"(we explain this omission below). After these adjustments to the data, we have a base sample of 769,199 …rms from 93 countries.
We use the benchmark input-output accounts published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to calculate the degree of vertical integration for each …rm in our sample (see Lawson, 1997 , for a discussion of the accounts). Our methodology follows the approach of Fan and Lang (2000). 13 The input-output accounts report the dollar value of each input enriched the incentive problems along the lines of the PRT of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) , there will also be underinvestment problems under vertical integration. Nevertheless, to the extent that these within-…rm distortions are independent of contracting institutions, they should have no e¤ect on the comparative static results in Proposition 2. 1 1 In the entire sample, approximately 64% of …rms report one SIC code, 24% report two codes, 8% report three codes, 2% report four codes, 1% report …ve codes, and less than 1% report six codes. Note that we do not have the breakdown of sales by SIC for …rms active in multiple industries. 1 2 This excludes 15 non-independent territories, three independent countries below the World Bank size threshold, and one disputed territory. Taiwan is retained and treated as though it were a separate country despite not being in the World Bank database. 1 3 See also Acemoglu, Aghion, Gri¢ th and Zilibotti (2004) for an application of a similar methodology on UK data. used to produce the output of 498 di¤erent industries in the U.S. economy. We use the 1992 input-output accounts because these are the most recently published at the 6-digit inputoutput (IO) code level. Input-output tables from the U.S. should be informative about input ‡ows across industries, to the extent these are determined by technology. For example, in all countries, car makers need to obtain tires, steel, and plastic from plants specialized in the manufacture of those goods. 14 We begin by matching the 4-digit SIC codes from each …rm in our sample with the appropriate 6-digit IO code, using the BEA's concordance guide (see Lawson, 1997) . Following Fan and Lang (2000), we exclude IO codes 69.01 and 69.02 (wholesale and retail trade) from our analysis because the input-output classi…cation system does not de…ne these categories …nely enough to allow meaningful vertical integration calculations -almost all 4-digit SIC codes between 5000 and 5999 map into just these two IO codes.
For every pair of industries, IO i and IO j , the input-output accounts allow us to calculate the dollar value of IO i required to produce a dollar's worth of IO j in the United States. This amount, which we call the vertical integration coe¢ cient, VI ij , represents the opportunity for vertical integration between IO i and IO j , i.e., when it is higher, there is more use of input i in the production of output j.
Using the full set of vertical integration coe¢ cients (i.e., VI ij for every IO i and IO j ), we calculate a vertical integration index for each …rm in our dataset. The index is denoted by v cif for …rm f in industry i in country c, and is de…ned as
where N f is the set of industries in which …rm f is active and jN f j denotes the number of these industries. In words, we …rst sum the VI ij coe¢ cients between the …rm's primary industry and all industries in which the …rm operates. This sum represents the dollar value of inputs from industries in which the …rm operates that is required to produce one dollar's worth of the …rm's primary output. We then create a similar index v cif for secondary industries in which a …rm operates. The vertical integration index is then the average of these sums for each …rm, and as such represents the average opportunity for vertical integration in all lines of a business in which the …rm is active. 15 1 4 The use of the same input-output table across countries is justi…ed when all countries share the same technology frontier and when either all production functions are Leontief or there is factor price equalization. However, even when these stringent assumptions are not satis…ed, we expect there to be a correlation in the input use patterns across countries. 1 5 We also conducted extensive robustness checks using only the primary (SIC) industry of each …rm. The Across all 769,199 …rms in our dataset, this index ranges from 0 (i.e., no vertical integration) to 53.5 (i.e., an average of 53.5 cents worth of the inputs required to produce one dollar's worth of output are produced by industries in which the …rm operates).
For an example of how the vertical integration index is created, consider a Japanese auto maker in our data (primary code 59.0301) which also has two secondary sectors in (Notice that industries have VI ij coe¢ cients with themselves; for example, miscellaneous plastic products are required to produce miscellaneous plastic products.) The bottom row shows the sum of the VI ij for each industry, for example, 12.3 cents worth of the inputs required to make autos can be produced within this …rm. The vertical integration index for this …rm, v cif , is then the average of the sums in the bottom row. 16 The …rst row of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the vertical integration index at the …rm level, and the third row of Table 1 reports statistics for countries'average level of vertical integration. Table 1 also provides descriptive statistics for the other country-level measures we use as independent variables. In Row 5 we report our measure of …nancial development. This is the value of domestic credit provided to the private sector (as a percent of GDP), taken from World Bank data for the year 2000. This measure has been used frequently in other work (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Rows 6 through 9 report our di¤erent measures of contracting institutions. Row 6 reports the procedural complexity index, which is an index of the complexity in collecting a commercial debt valued at 50% of GDP per capita. measure of the number of procedures required to enforce a contract, but it re ‡ects procedures for collecting a debt valued at 200% of GDP per capita, a variable also reported by the World Bank. Row 9 reports legal formalism, which is an index of formality in legal procedures for collecting a bounced check. This variable comes from Djankov et al (2003) . 17 For all measures of contracting costs, a higher value re ‡ects greater costs or greater complexity in enforcing contracts in that country.
Other variables reported in Table 1 include the log of country population (Row 10), which is taken from World Bank data for the year 2000. Row 11 is the log of GDP per capita in 2000. Our GDP estimates are PPP adjusted and are taken from the World Factbook. 18 Appendix Table A1 reports correlation coe¢ cients of the country-level variables. The other rows of Table 1 report summary statistics on the number of employees per …rm (Row 2) and the vertical integration propensity by country (Row 4, discussed in the next section).
Rows 12 through 18 report characteristics of relevant industries from U.S. data (discussed in Section 5).
Main E¤ects of Financial Development and Contracting Costs
In this section we study the main e¤ects of …nancial development and contracting costs on the level of vertical integration across countries. First, Proposition 1 of our model predicts a positive association between credit market development and vertical integration, although other theories based on the e¤ect of credit market constraints on entry would suggest a negative association. Second, our model's prediction for the e¤ect of contracting costs on vertical integration is ambiguous. However, theories emphasizing the role of contracting institutions in the internal organization of the …rm, such as Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , would suggest a negative correlation between vertical integration and the quality of contracting institutions. We turn to our …rm-level dataset to investigate whether any main e¤ects of …nancial development or contracting costs are apparent in the data.
Main Results
In the odd-numbered columns of Table 2 we estimate the following equation:
where v cf is vertical integration in …rm f in country c, x c is the set of country-level covariates, speci…cally, our measures of …nancial development or contracting costs, and z f is a set of …rm-level covariates, in particular, …rm size, as measure by the log of the number of employees.
Note, however, that equation (7) does not account for cross-country di¤erences in industrial composition. The extent of vertical integration varies markedly across sectors. Not controlling for industrial composition may lead to a spurious relationship between country characteristics and vertical integration. Consequently, our preferred speci…cations are presented in the even-numbered columns of Table 2 and include a full set of industry …xed e¤ects,
i.e.,
where v cif is vertical integration of …rm f in industry i of country c, x c and z f are countrylevel and …rm-level covariates as before, and the i 's are a full set of industry …xed e¤ects (dummies). These …xed e¤ects enable us to capture cross-industry di¤erences in the technological or other determinants of vertical integration. The industry dummies are de…ned at the two-digit IO level, which results in a set of 76 dummy variables. 19 The inclusion of a full set of industry dummies implies that in equation (8), all cross-country comparisons are relative to the "mean propensity to integrate"in a particular industry. In other words, this regression looks at, for example, whether …rms in a country with worse contracting institutions are more of vertically integrated relative to …rms in a country with better contracting institutions in the same industry. In the regressions in Table 2 , because the variables of interest, …nancial development and contracting costs, vary only at the country level, the standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level.
The inclusion of …rm size as a control variable in both (7) and (8) is important because a potential concern with the results in this paper is sample selection. Our dataset contains different numbers of …rms from di¤erent countries, and this variation in the selection of samples of …rms could be a source of variation in vertical integration. The main source of the problem would be potential correlation between vertical integration and …rm size (combined with di¤erential selection on …rm size across countries). For example, it could be that relatively larger companies are more vertically integrated and from countries with weaker institutional environments we only observe relatively larger companies. Estimating the relationship between vertical integration and contracting or …nancial institutions at the …rm level, while also controlling for …rm size, partially alleviates this sample selection concern. 20 Column 1 of Table 2 Therefore, as with the results for …nancial development, the raw correlation between contracting institutions and vertical integration appears to be spurious and accounted for by cross-country di¤erences in industry composition.
We conduct a series of robustness checks to ensure that this general pattern persists in alternative speci…cations. In additional tests (not reported) we …nd similar results when we limit the dataset to manufacturing industries, when we exclude the most and least vertically integrated industries, and when we limit the analysis to industries that appear in 90% or more of the countries in the dataset. In all cases, there is a correlation between …nancial development or contracting institutions and vertical integration without industry controls, but this correlation disappears once we control for industry composition by including a full set of industry dummies.
The lack of a correlation between our institutional measures and vertical integration after controlling for industrial composition can be interpreted in di¤erent ways. One possibility is that our measures of speci…c institutions do not adequately capture cross-country di¤erences in these factors. Naturally, the various proxies for contracting costs and …nancial development are imperfect and potentially measured with error. Nevertheless, in addition to the results in Table 2 that do not control for industry, previous work shows that these indices do have signi…cant information content, and are correlated with economic outcomes (see, e.g., Djankov et al, 2003) . Moreover, we will show below signi…cant and robust results consistent with the predictions of Proposition 2 using the same measures. Thus the lack of correlation between these measures and vertical integration is unlikely to be driven by measurement error.
Another possibility is simply that these speci…c institutions have no impact on average vertical integration across countries. Such an interpretation would be a challenge to many of the theories discussed in the introduction, which (implicitly or explicitly) suggest that di¤erences in contracting costs or credit market development should have a major e¤ect on cross-country patterns of the internal organization of the …rm and vertical integration.
However, as shown in Section 2, somewhat more re…ned theories make more robust predictions about interactions rather than main e¤ects. In Section 5 we show that the data provide considerable support for these interaction e¤ects.
Before turning to the interaction e¤ects, one other interpretation also needs to be discussed. It may be that the lack of signi…cance of …nancial development and contracting costs after controlling for industrial composition re ‡ects a more subtle e¤ect of these speci…c institutions on the internal organization of …rms. Perhaps these institutional factors in ‡uence the industrial composition as a way of preventing the transaction costs and the underinvestment problems that are more prevalent in certain sectors. For example, countries with worse contracting institutions or more limited …nancial development may be more concentrated in industries that typically have higher vertical integration, such as mining (ferrous and nonferrous), petroleum and gas, leather, fabrics, chemicals, apparel, and electronic components, precisely as a way of preventing the costs of weaker contracts and less developed …nancial markets. We investigate this possibility in the next subsection and show that this mechanism does not seem to be responsible for the lack of an e¤ect from contracting and …nancial institutions to the internal organization of the …rm.
Vertical Integration Propensity
To study why the signi…cant correlation between vertical integration and our measures of speci…c institutions disappears when industry dummies are included in the regressions, we calculate, for each country, the propensity to vertically integrate according to industrial
where^ i 's are the estimates of the industry dummies (reported in Table A2 ) from a …rm-level regression of vertical integration on industry dummies using U.S. data, S ci is total sales in industry i in country c, and S c is total sales in country c. The dummies^ i 's measure the average level of vertical integration in industry i in the U.S., soV c measures the average tendency for vertical integration in the country due to its industrial composition. In other words,V c measures the extent of vertical integration in a country if the country had the average level of vertical integration in the United States corresponding to each industry. 21 Consequently, the source of variation inV c arises purely from the industrial composition of the country.
We estimate the following simple model:
whereV c is the vertical integration propensity for country c, x c is a vector of country-level variables including either …nancial development or contracting costs as well as the log of population (to control for country size) and the log of GDP per capita, and " c is an error term capturing all omitted factors.
In Table 3 , we report results from regressions estimating equation (9) . In the oddnumbered columns of Table 3 , we report results without per-capita GDP as an explanatory variable. Column 1 of Table 3 shows a signi…cant negative correlation between …nan-cial development and vertical integration propensity. The remaining odd-numbered columns demonstrate a signi…cant positive correlation between all four measures of contracting costs and vertical integration propensity. The magnitude of the coe¢ cients in the odd-numbered columns implies that a one standard deviation increase in …nancial development is associated with about a 1/3 standard deviation fall in a country's vertical integration propensity, and that a one standard deviation increase in contracting costs is associated with about a 1/4 to 1/3 standard deviation increase in vertical integration propensity.
These results illustrate why the correlations between vertical integration and contracting and …nancial institutions disappear when we control for industrial composition (industry dum- 2 1 In alternative tests we have also calculated the industry dummy coe¢ cients using data from all G7 nations and also using data from all 93 countries in our dataset. The results are very similar to our baseline results and are available upon request. mies). Countries with weaker institutions, as measured by contracting costs or credit market development, tend to be concentrated in industries with higher (technological) propensity for vertical integration. This pattern is therefore consistent with a major e¤ect of contracting institutions or …nancial development on industry composition.
However, the even-numbered columns of Table 3 strongly weigh against this interpretation. These columns show that the relationship between contracting and …nancial institutions and the vertical integration propensity disappears once we control for (log) GDP per capita. There appears to be a strong negative correlation between per-capita GDP and vertical integration propensity. In each of the even-numbered columns, the inclusion of GDP per capita entirely eliminates the signi…cant e¤ect of …nancial development and contracting costs. This evidence therefore suggests that di¤erences in industry composition and the resulting di¤erences in vertical integration propensity across countries are more likely to be due to di¤erences in the stage of development rather than a direct consequence of weaker contracting institutions or lower levels of …nancial development.
Interaction E¤ects
The results in the previous section may suggest that there are no robust regularities in cross-country vertical integration patterns once we control for industrial composition. In this section, we turn to interaction e¤ects to show that this is not true. Here we focus on the interaction e¤ects predicted by our model in Proposition 2. We …rst study the interaction e¤ect of …nancial development combined with contracting costs, and then focus on the di¤erential e¤ects of contracting costs across industries.
The Interaction of Financial Development and Contracting Costs
The …rst implication of Proposition 2 is that vertical integration should be more prevalent in countries that have both higher contracting costs and greater …nancial development. To test this implication we conduct additional regressions of the type shown in equation (8), with some modi…cations. As an additional country-level regressor (x c ) we include our variable of interest, the interaction of …nancial development and contracting costs. In addition, as control variables for size and development we include among x c log population and the log of per-capita GDP. Industry dummies are included in all speci…cations. Table 4 presents the results on the interaction of …nancial development and contracting costs. The four columns in the table correspond to the four di¤erent measures of contract-ing costs. The …rst two rows of Table 4 report the main e¤ects of …nancial development and contracting costs. The third row reports the coe¢ cients for our variable of interest, the interaction of …nancial development and contracting costs. Table 4 shows that for all four measures of contracting costs, the coe¢ cient on our interaction term is positive and statistically signi…cant. The magnitude of the coe¢ cients suggests, for example, that in countries with the weakest …nancial development, a one standard deviation increase in contracting costs is associated with only a small increase in a country's average vertical integration index, but that in the countries with the strongest …nancial development, a one standard deviation increase in contracting costs is associated with roughly a 3/4 standard deviation increase in a country's average vertical integration index (depending on the contracting measure). The coe¢ cients on per-capita GDP and population are positive and generally signi…cant; the inclusion of these variables demonstrates that …nancial development and contracting costs are not picking up other e¤ects associated with the size or development of countries. It is also worth noting in Table 4 that the main e¤ects of contracting costs are now positive and usually signi…cant, even though industry dummies are included in the regression. The main e¤ects of …nancial development, on the other hand, are not signi…cant. 22 Table 4 shows that …nancial development and contracting costs do have a signi…cant correlation with a country's level of vertical integration, but that it is the interaction of these two institutional factors that has the greatest importance.
In Tables 5 and 6 we report additional tests to assess the robustness of the results presented in Table 4 . In Table 5 we repeat the regressions of Table 4 , but also include the interaction of GDP per capita with contracting costs and with …nancial development as additional explanatory variables. The motivation for including these terms is that existing work demonstrates that …nancial development is correlated with the stage of economic development, and moreover, the results in Table 3 show how controlling for GDP per capita changes the relationship between contracting and …nancial institutions and vertical integration propensity. Consequently, we would like to make sure that the interaction of …nancial development and contracting costs is not just proxying for other factors associated with the stage of development interacted with contracting costs or …nancial development. Table 5 is reassuring in this respect. It shows that the results are robust to inclusion of these additional interaction terms. In Columns 1 through 4 we include the interaction of log GDP per capita and contracting costs. In all four columns, the coe¢ cient on the interaction of …nancial 2 2 The main e¤ects are evaluated at their sample mean values to allow proper interpretation. development and contracting costs is positive, statistically signi…cant and also of a similar magnitude to the estimates in Table 4 . For example, with the procedural complexity measure the coe¢ cient estimate of the interaction term is 0.21 (standard error = 0.09) compared to 0.24 in Table 4 . In all cases, the interactions of contracting costs with GDP per capita are always small and insigni…cant. In Column 5 we include the interaction of GDP per capita and …nancial development. The coe¢ cient on the interaction between …nancial development and the procedural complexity measure of contracting costs remains positive and signi…cant.
Finally, in Column 6 we include both the interactions of …nancial development and GDP per capita and contracting costs and GDP per capita. The coe¢ cient on the interaction between …nancial development and the procedural complexity index remains very similar to the baseline and is statistically signi…cant (0.23, standard error = 0 .09), while the GDP interactions continue to be insigni…cant. 23 In Table 6 we again repeat the regressions of Table 4 , but we now include squared terms for …nancial development and contracting costs. Our motivation is to assess whether the interaction of …nancial development and contracting costs proxies for non-linear e¤ects of the institutional factors. Table 6 shows that the results are generally robust to inclusion of the squared terms, but that the coe¢ cients on the interaction of …nancial development and contracting costs are somewhat smaller. In all four columns the coe¢ cient on the interaction term remains positive. In two cases, the coe¢ cient continues to be statistically signi…cant, but it loses signi…cance in the other two (with contract enforcement procedures for a 200% debt and legal formalism as the measures of contracting costs).
Overall, the results in Tables 4 through 6 
Country-Industry Interactions
The regression equations so far impose a "constant e¤ect"of speci…c institutional characteristics on vertical integration. Another possibility is that these characteristics have di¤erential e¤ects across industries. This is the second implication of Proposition 2. In particular, our model predicts that contracting costs will have a larger impact on the vertical integration 2 3 The results with the other measures of contracting costs are similar and not reported to save space. decision in industries that are more susceptible to supplier holdup problems. As a proxy for the extent of holdup problems in a particular industry, we use the industry's capital intensity.
We estimate regressions of the following form
where y c represents (log) income per capita, x c represents one of our measures of contracting costs, and m i represents industry-level characteristics that proxy for severity of holdup problems. The main e¤ect for m i is already taken out by the full set of industry dummies, the i 's.
The main coe¢ cient of interest in this speci…cation is , and for this reason, we also include in this equation a full set of country dummies, c . The term y c m i is included to investigate whether the interaction is between the speci…c institutional features and industry characteristics as opposed to some other factor related to income per capita (for example, a broader notion of institutional di¤erences). We also include …rm-level characteristics, speci…cally the log of the number of employees as a measure of …rm size (z f ).
Following the methodology in Rajan and Zingales (1998), all of the industry-level measures are based on U.S. data. In doing so we are assuming (analogous to assumptions made in Rajan and Zingales, 1998) that characteristics of industries in the U.S. economy are representative of (or at the very least correlated with) the characteristics of the same industries in other countries. In Table 7 our industry characteristic is capital intensity, which we measure as the log of the ratio of …xed assets to sales for …rms in the particular industry in the U.S.
Although capital intensity is clearly not a perfect proxy for the severity of holdup problems, others have emphasized the connection between capital intensity and vertical integration (e.g., Chandler, 1976; Antràs, 2003) and have used measures of capital intensity as proxies for asset speci…city or the incentive to vertically integrate (e.g., MacDonald, 1985; Lieberman, 1991) .
In addition, holdup problems related to capital intensity may be precisely those for which vertical integration is a good remedy. In contrast, the problems arising from more intangible characteristics of sectors or …rms might lead to the countervailing incentive problems within …rms as emphasized by the PRT approach of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) .
In all of the results reported below, we calculate capital intensity using the Compustat database. We aggregate the data by …rst taking the average ratio of …xed assets to sales across all years 1990-1999 for each …rm in Compustat, and then by taking the median of this ratio across all …rms in each industry. In later tables, we employ alternative measures of capital intensity. Descriptive statistics for all industry-level measures are found in Rows 12 through 18 of Table 1 .
Estimates from equation (10) are reported in Table 7 Table 7 suggest that a country's level of contracting costs does have a signi…cant correlation with average vertical integration in the country, and that this e¤ect is more pronounced in industries that are more capital intensive.
In Tables 8 through 10 we report additional tests to assess the robustness of the signi…cant interaction e¤ect of contracting costs and capital intensity on vertical integration. In Table   8 we repeat the regressions of Table 7 but add additional interaction terms to assess if the signi…cance of contracting costs and capital intensity is subsumed by other potential interaction e¤ects. In Column 1 of Table 8 , we add the interaction of …nancial development and an industry's dependence on external …nance. Our model, and existing theory, suggests that …nancial development matters for the organization of production, and, as argued by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , the e¤ect of …nancial development may be more pronounced in industries with greater dependence on external …nance. As with our capital intensity measure, external dependence is calculated from the Compustat database, and it is de…ned as in Rajan and Zingales (1998). Column 1 of Table 8 reports a signi…cant e¤ect on vertical integration from the interaction of …nancial development and external dependence, but this e¤ect does not subsume the e¤ect of contracting costs interacted with capital intensity, which retains a signi…cant positive e¤ect.
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 we add other combinations of the interactions used in Column 1. In Column 2 we include contracting costs interacted with external dependence, and in Column 3 we include …nancial development interacted with capital intensity. In both columns, the interaction of contracting costs and capital intensity retains its positive sign and statistical signi…cance, although the coe¢ cient is only marginally signi…cant in Column 3. In Column 4 we include all three alternative interaction terms as controls. With all three controls included, as well as the interaction of per-capita GDP and capital intensity, this is a stringent test of the robustness of our interaction prediction. Column 4 shows that the coe¢ cient on the interaction of contracting costs and capital intensity retains its positive sign and is signi…cant at the 5% level. In Columns 5 through 7 of Table 8 we repeat the test in Column 4 using the three other measures of contracting costs. With contract enforcement procedures (50% debt) as the measure of contracting costs, the coe¢ cient on the interaction of contracting and capital intensity is positive and signi…cant. For the other two measures, the coe¢ cients are positive, but the coe¢ cient on the interaction of legal formalism and capital intensity loses signi…cance relative to the results in Table 7 .
In Table 9 we repeat the regressions of Table 7 using alternative measures of capital intensity. The …rst two measures, the ratio of …xed assets to total assets and the ratio of …xed assets to employees, also come from the Compustat database and are calculated in analogous fashion to the ratio of …xed assets to sales. The next two measures, the ratio of capital stock to employment and the ratio of capital stock to value added, are calculated from the NBER productivity database. Because this measure is available only for manufacturing industries, the number of observations in regressions using this variable is smaller. The …nal measure, the ratio of capital to output, is taken from Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), who calculate capital intensity from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) for the year 1990. We use the concordance that these authors developed to map the NIPA industries to our IO industries. All capital intensity measures are in logs. Table 9 reports the results of estimating equation (10) with the alternative measures of capital intensity. The …ve columns in the table correspond to di¤erent measures of capital intensity as noted. In each column, the coe¢ cient on the interaction of contracting costs and capital intensity retains its positive sign, and in four out of the …ve cases, the coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cant. Table 9 shows that this signi…cant interaction e¤ect is robust to alternative de…nitions of capital intensity. 24 2 4 We also experimented with estimates of equation (10) using an alternative measure of holdup problems used and constructed by Nunn (2007) that is intended to proxy for the degree to which industries rely on relationship-speci…c investments. Nunn (2007) uses data from Rauch (1999) to identify relationship-speci…c inputs as those not sold on organized exchanges or reference priced in trade publications. We repeated our regressions using this measure of relationship speci…city as the industry characteristic, but the results (not reported) were generally not signi…cant, and when signi…cant they tended to be non-robust. While we do not know the exact reason why the results are di¤erent with capital intensity and the measures of As a …nal set of tests, in Table 10 we report additional robustness checks of the signi…cant e¤ect of contracting costs interacted with capital intensity. In Panel A of Table 10 we limit the sample to manufacturing industries. The coe¢ cient on the interaction of contracting costs and capital intensity retains its positive sign in all columns, and is statistically signi…cant in all but one of the columns. In Panel B of Table 10 we exclude industries that are naturally the most and least vertically integrated (based on U.S. data). We exclude those industries that fall in the highest and lowest 5% in level of vertical integration. The motivation for this test is to assess if our results are driven by a small number of industries with extreme levels of vertical integration. The results in Panel B are similar to previous results. All coe¢ cients on our interaction term of interest are positive, and all but one of the coe¢ cients are signi…cant at standard levels. In Panel C of Table 10 we limit our sample to industries for which there are existing …rms in most (90% or more) of the countries in the sample. The motivation for this test is to ensure that our results are not driven by a few relatively uncommon industries.
The results in Panel C again show positive coe¢ cients on our interaction term of interest in all cases, with statistical signi…cance in all but two of the columns.
Overall, the results in Tables 7 through 10 show that there is a relatively robust association between vertical integration with the interaction of contracting costs and capital intensity is robust. These results are again consistent with Proposition 2, which suggests that contracting costs should have a di¤erential e¤ect on the organization of production in capital intensive industries.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the cross-country determinants of vertical integration in a new dataset of over 750,000 …rms from 93 countries. Our focus is on the e¤ect of speci…c institutional features on the vertical integration decisions of …rms. This focus is motivated by both empirics and theory. Casual empiricism and existing work suggest that there are large di¤erences in the organization of production and …rms across countries and that this may be related to relationship speci…city, a number of explanations are possible. First, capital intensity of a sector in the United States, which is a broadly technological characteristic, may be a better predictor of capital intensity in other countries than the measure of relationship speci…city, which is the result of market interactions and not a technological characteristic. Second, as noted above, capital intensity might be better suited to assess the view of Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) , in which vertical integration resolves contracting problems, whereas relationship speci…city might lead to the types of problems emphasized in the PRT approach of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) , in which the e¤ects of vertical integration are more complex. Put di¤erently, it may be that high capital intensity leads to contracting problems that vertical integration resolves in a relatively straightforward manner, while other forms of contracting problems are more di¢ cult to resolve with vertical integration. contracting problems. Relatedly, a body of in ‡uential theories suggest that contracting costs and credit market development should be important determinants of vertical integration.
We present a model which builds on these existing results. While our model suggests that the main e¤ects of institutional features may be important for vertical integration, the more compelling aspects of our model are the predictions for interaction e¤ects of these institutional factors. In particular, our model suggests an important interaction e¤ect of contracting costs combined with …nancial development. In addition, it predicts that contracting costs will have a greater e¤ect in industries with the potential for more severe holdup problems.
Our empirical results do not con…rm the importance of the main e¤ects of …nancial development and contracting costs. Although vertical integration is correlated with contracting institutions and …nancial development, we …nd that these correlations are spurious and entirely driven by cross-country di¤erences in industrial composition. In particular, countries with higher contracting costs or more limited …nancial development are concentrated in industries with a high propensity for vertical integration. Once we control for di¤erences in industrial composition, none of these factors seem to a¤ect vertical integration.
Nevertheless, the predictions of our simple model concerning interactions receive substantial empirical support. We …nd a robust di¤erential e¤ect of contracting costs across industries: countries with higher contracting costs are signi…cantly more integrated in industries that are more capital intensive. We also …nd that the interaction of contracting costs and …nancial development has a signi…cant relationship with cross-country di¤erences in vertical integration. In short, contracting costs may have a strong impact on vertical integration, but the e¤ect is more pronounced in relatively capital-intensive industries, and stronger …nan-cial development may be a prerequisite for …rms to e¢ ciently integrate in response to high contracting costs.
We view our study as a …rst step in understanding the cross-country patterns of organization of …rms. Despite the importance of the organization of production for productivity and the existence of various in ‡uential theories, we know very little about these patterns.
The dataset and the approach in this paper can be useful in investigating other dimensions of di¤erences in the organization of …rms across countries. The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on measures of contracting costs and financial development. Contracting costs are measured alternately as procedural complexity, contract enforcement procedures, or legal formalism, as noted. Even-numbered columns include a full set of industry dummies based on 77 BEA-defined industries. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within countries, are in parentheses. of a country's vertical integration propensity on measures of contracting costs and financial development. "Vertical integration propensity" is a measure of the average tendency for firms in the country to vertically integrate based on how the country's industrial composition is weighted in industries with a natural propensity for vertical integration. Contracting costs are measured alternately as procedural complexity, contract enforcement procedures, or legal formalism, as noted. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on measures of contracting costs and financial development. Contracting costs are measured alternately as procedural complexity, contract enforcement procedures, or legal formalism, as noted. Also included but not reported are a full set of industry dummies based on 77 BEA-defined industries. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within countries, are in parentheses. Interaction terms are created using demeaned variables. The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on measures of contracting costs and financial development. Contracting costs are measured alternately as procedural complexity, contract enforcement procedures, or legal formalism, as noted. Also included but not reported are a full set of industry dummies based on 77 BEA-defined industries. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within countries, are in parentheses. Interaction terms are created using demeaned variables. of a firm-level vertical integration index on measures of contracting costs and financial development. Contracting costs are measured alternately as procedural complexity, contract enforcement procedures, or legal formalism, as noted. Also included but not reported are a full set of industry dummies based on 77 BEA-defined industries. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within countries, are in parentheses. Interaction terms are created using demeaned variables. of a firm-level vertical integration index on the interaction of contracting costs and capital intensity. Contracting costs are measured alternately as procedural complexity, contract enforcement procedures, or legal formalism, as noted. Capital intensity (the log of the ratio of fixed assets to sales) comes from the Compustat database. Also included but not reported are a full set of industry dummies (based on 77 BEA-defined industries) and a full set of country dummies. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within country/industry pairs, are in parentheses. Contracting costs are measured alternately as procedural complexity, contract enforcement procedures, or legal formalism, as noted. Capital intensity (the log of the ratio of fixed assets to sales) and external dependence (i.e, dependence on external finance as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998) come from the Compustat database. Also included but not reported are a full set of industry dummies (based on 77 BEA-defined industries) and a full set of country dummies. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within country/industry pairs, are in parentheses. Table 9 The interaction of contracting costs and capital intensity, alternative measures of capital intensity regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on contracting costs (measured as procedural complexity) interacted with capital intensity. Capital intensity measures are in logs and come U.S. data from the Compustat database, NBER productivity database, or Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), as noted. Also included but not reported are a full set of industry dummies (based on 77 BEA-defined industries) and a full set of country dummies. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within country/industry pairs, are in parentheses. regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on contracting costs (measured as procedural complexity) interacted with capital intensity. Capital intensity measures are in logs and come U.S. data from the Compustat database, NBER productivity database, or Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), as noted. Also included but not reported are a full set of industry dummies (based on 77 BEA-defined industries) and a full set of country dummies. "Most and least vertically integrated industries" refers to the 5% most and 5% least vertically integrated industries. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within country/industry pairs, are in parentheses. The table reports estimated dummy variables in a firm-level regression of vertical integration on industry dummies using U.S. data.
